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INTRODUCTION
In todays society, most teenagers have a cell phone, and, often, the teenager is
glued to the screen of the phone.1 Students bring these phones to school to commu-
nicate with their parents if an emergency occurs, but sometimes the students are
improperly communicating throughout the day with other students.2 Cell phones
cause a distraction to not only the students using the cell phone, but also to other
* J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2016; B.A., University of Virginia, 2013.
1 See MARY MADDEN ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS AND TECHNOLOGY 2013, at 2
(2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2013/PIP_TeensandTech
nology2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/9ZP8-GKJ5] (highlighting the fact that 78% of teens have
a cell phone).
2 See, e.g., Price v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 855 N.Y.S.2d 530, 54243 (N.Y. App. Div.
2008) (detailing reasons for bringing cell phones to school to determine whether a school
system can ban student cell phones from the school premises).
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students and the teacher in the classroom.3 If a teacher observes a student with a cell
phone, the teacher confiscates the phone and often delivers it to the administrative
office for disciplinary purposes.4 In some of these instances, the school officials search
the phone to find evidence of criminal conduct or another violation of school poli-
cies on the phone.5
Courts have allowed an exception to the warrant requirement for warrantless
searches conducted by school officials under the standard the Supreme Court con-
structed in New Jersey v. T.L.O.6 Based on the special needs required by the school
setting, school officials must have reasonable suspicion for the search, and the search
cannot be excessively intrusive.7 When reviewing searches of cell phones con-
ducted by school officials, courts have relied on this standard even though the two-
part test was handed down in 1985, before cell phones were prolific or even present
in schools.8
In 2014, the Supreme Court reviewed a similar, well-established exception to
the warrant requirement in the cell phone context.9 The Court ruled that for a search
of a cell phone incident to an arrest, police must obtain a warrant, because the cell
phone is unique from other tangible items that can be searched.10 The Court con-
cluded that when the exception was first introduced in 1969, the Court could not have
conceived the characteristics and capabilities of modern cell phones.11
This Note develops the argument that the characteristics of a cell phone compel
a reconsideration of the T.L.O. standard for warrantless searches conducted by
3 Id. at 535.
4 See, e.g., Koch v. Adams, 361 S.W.3d 817 (2010) (highlighting the fact that a student
violated the student handbook by having a cell phone in the classroom, that officials confis-
cated the phone, and that they then sent the phone to the parents in the mail two weeks later).
5 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622, 627 (E.D. Pa. 2006)
(highlighting the fact that school officials called contacts in a confiscated phone to determine
if other students were violating school policy).
6 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
7 Id. at 342.
8 See, e.g., Klump, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 641. In 1985, there were 340,213 U.S. cell phone
subscribers. CTIA,CTIASWIRELESS INDUSTRY INDICES:19852013 (2014), http://www.ctia
.org/docs/default-source/Facts-Stats/ctia_survey_ye_2013_graphics-final.pdf [http://perma
.cc/2LFL-Z5QY]. As of December 2014, however, there were 335,400,000 active cell phone
devices in the United States, which is more than the population, but many users have more
than one wireless device. Your Wireless Life: Annual Wireless Industry Survey, CTIA, http://
www.ctia.org/your-wireless-life/how-wireless-works/annual-wireless-industry-survey [http://
perma.cc/ESD3-3YHS] (last updated June 2015).
9 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (analyzing the search incident to arrest
exception).
10 Id. at 2493.
11 Id. at 4584 (highlighting the fact that the original search incident to arrest exception was
introduced by the Court in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969)).
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school officials.12 Rileyand other Fourth Amendment cases dealing with new
technologiesestablished the framework for reconsideration in other contexts of the
Fourth Amendment in relation to cell phones and other new technologies through a
balancing test.13 Following Riley, this Note argues that a students heightened expec-
tation of privacy in her cell phone outweighs the schools interests in maintaining
order and protecting the safety of students.14
This Note first examines the historical context of the Fourth Amendment,
specifically in relation to school searches.15 Second, this Note details the current prob-
lem with cell phones in schools and introduces the limited amount of cases that have
dealt with a warrantless search of a cell phone in schools.16 This Note then reviews
Riley v. California17 and argues that it brings clarity to the growing concern of war-
rantless searches of student cell phones.18 Finally, this Note looks for guidance from
other warrant exceptions,19 and then concludes by offering possible policies relating
to cell phones that school districts could implement.20
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O.
A. Historical Overview of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon prob-
able cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.21
During colonial times, the English issued general warrants against the American colo-
nists, which caused much uproar.22 Resistance to these general warrants was the under-
lying reason for the Fourth Amendment, which sought to protect a persons privacy
from invasions by any general authority to search and seize his goods and papers.23
12 See infra Part IV.
13 See infra Part IV.A.
14 See infra Part IV.D.
15 See infra Part I.
16 See infra Part II.
17 See infra Part III.
18 See infra Part IV.
19 See infra Part V.
20 See infra Part VI.
21 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
22 See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914).
23 Id.
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Centuries later, a unanimous Court determined that the Fourth Amendment,
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures conducted by state officers.24 The Court concluded that pro-
tecting ones privacy from unreasonable searches by police is implicit in the con-
cept of ordered liberty, and therefore enforceable against state officers through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.25
Early in the twentieth century, courts had yet to confer constitutional protections
on public schoolchildren.26 In 1943, however, the Court required public schools to
impart certain constitutional protections to students.27 That case dealt with the First
Amendment, but language used by the Justices extended the entire Bill of Rightss
protections to schoolchildren.28 Even though the protections were extended to chil-
dren in schools, students do not receive the full breadth of those protections.29 Sub-
sequent cases dealt with each fundamental right pertaining to children in schools.30
In 1985, the Supreme Court dealt with the Fourth Amendment and schoolchildren.31
B. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., a teacher caught a high school freshman with another
student, smoking cigarettes in the restroom.32 The teacher brought the student to the
assistant principals office, and the assistant principal asked the student whether she
was smoking: a violation of the schools policy.33 The student denied that she had
been smoking, and the assistant principal asked to see her purse.34
The assistant principal opened the purse and saw a package of cigarettes. Upon re-
moving the cigarettes, the assistant principal discovered a package of cigarette rolling
24 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960).
25 Id. (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
26 The Court, in 1940, even rejected certain freedom of religion objections when a school
system required children to salute to the flag. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586
(1940).
27 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
28 Id. (The Fourteenth Amendment, as now applied to the States, protects the citizen
against the State itself and all of its creaturesBoards of Education not excepted. These
have, of course, important, delicate, and highlydiscretionary functions, but none that they may
not perform within the limits of the Bill of Rights.).
29 See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)
(holding that speech can be curtailed if student behavior materially disrupts classwork).
30 See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977) (applying the Eighth Amendment
to schoolchildren); Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (applying
the First Amendment to schoolchildren).
31 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (finding a search of a students purse
reasonable after the student was found smoking on school grounds).
32 Id. at 328.
33 Id.
34 Id. The other student, with whom T.L.O. was caught in the restroom, admitted she had
violated the rule. Id.
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papers, which he, from his experience, knew were associated with the use of mari-
juana.35 After this discovery, the assistant principal conducted a closer examination of
the purse for additional evidence of drug use, and this thorough search of the purse
revealed a small amount of marihuana, a pipe, a number of
empty plastic bags, a substantial quantity of money in one-dollar
bills, an index card that appeared to be a list of students who
owed T. L. O. money, and two letters that implicated T. L. O. in
marihuana dealing.36
The assistant principal concluded his search and called the girls mother and the
police.37 Once the police arrived, the assistant principal turned over all the evidence
he found in the girls purse.38 On the basis of this evidence, the State brought delin-
quency charges against the girl, and T.L.O. filed a motion to suppress the assistant
principals search based on a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights.39 The New
Jersey juvenile court denied the motion, and then T.L.O. appealed to New Jersey state
court and eventually to the New Jersey Supreme Court.40 The New Jersey Supreme
Court held that the assistant principals search was unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment because he did not have the necessary level of suspicion to believe the
purse contained any evidence of wrongdoing.41
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the ruling, deeming the assistant principals
search reasonableunder theFourth Amendment.42 This holdingcarved out an exception
to the Fourth Amendments probable cause and warrant requirement that still holds
today for searches conducted in schools based on the special needs requirement.
The Court first found that the Fourth Amendment applied to public school
officials, but that is only the beginning of the inquiry into the standards governing
35 Id. The search was conducted in the assistant principals private office. Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id. T.L.O. confessed to the police that she had been dealing marijuana. Id. at 329.
39 Id.
40 Id. The juvenile court concluded that school officials can search a student if there is
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been or is in the process of being committed, or rea-
sonable cause to believe that the search is necessary to maintain school discipline or enforce
school policies. Id. (quoting State ex rel T.L.O., 428 A.2d 1327, 1333 (1980)). The appellate
division affirmed that there was no Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 330.
41 Id. at 33031 (According to the [New Jersey Supreme Court], the contents of T. L. O.s
purse had no bearing on the accusation against T. L. O. for possession of cigarettes (as opposed
to smoking them in the lavatory) did not violate school rules, and a mere desire for evidence
that would impeach T. L .O.s claim that she did not smoke cigarettes could not justify the
search. . . . Finally, leaving aside the question whether [the assistant principal] was justified
in opening the purse, the court held that the evidence of drug use that he saw inside did not
justify the extensive rummaging through T. L. O.s papers and effects that followed.) (citing
State ex rel T.L.O., 428 A.2d at 1334).
42 Id. at 346.
884 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 24:879
such searches.43 Justice White stated that reasonableness is the ultimate touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment, and [t]he determination of the standard of reasonable-
ness governing any specific class of searches requires balancing the need to search
against the invasion which the search entails.44 The balancing test weighs, on one
side, the childs legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security, versus the
governmentsor in this case, the schoolsneed for effective methods to deal with
breaches of public order.45 Expectation of privacy has to not only be legitimate in
the eyes of the child, but society has to be prepared to recognize the privacy concern
as legitimate as well.46
In reviewing a students legitimate expectations of privacy, the Court concluded
that a student does have some privacy expectations, but those expectations are eased
in the school setting.47 The main factor [a]gainst the childs interest in privacy
[is] the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline
in the classroom and on school grounds. Maintaining order in the classroom has
never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly
forms.48 The scale is tipped in the governments favor because requiring school of-
ficials to obtain a warrant would frustrate the reasons for the search and the informal
disciplinary procedures of the educational process.49
With the balance in favor of governmental interests, the Court eliminated the
warrant requirement and also withdrew the probable cause requirement in the school
setting.50 Instead of the normal probable cause requirement, the Court stated that the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under
all the circumstances, of the search.51 To determine the reasonableness of anyschool
search requires a court to conduct a two-step inquiry: (1) whether the search was
43 Id. at 337. There was a lengthy discussion in the Courts opinion dealing with this
question, because, even though the Court had applied the Bill of Rightss protections to
schoolchildren, a few lower courts had found that Fourth Amendment protections did not
apply. Id. at 336. The Court disregarded those decisions based on earlier cases dealing with
schoolchildrens rights and the First Amendment. Id. at 33637.
44 Id. at 337 (quoting Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 53637 (1967)).
45 Id. This is the test that the Court uses each time it faces the question of whether to
allow an exception to the warrant requirement. See, e.g., Camara, 387 U.S. 523.
46 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 33839.
47 Id. at 340. The student has reason to bring certain items to schoolsuch as keys or
moneyand nothing suggests that bringing these items onto school grounds would waive
all privacy concerns. Id. at 339.
48 Id. The Court stated that, with this difficulty in maintaining security and order, school
officials are allowed a certain degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures. Id. at
33940.
49 Id. at 340.
50 Id. at 34041.
51 Id. at 341. This standard was construed on the basis that the privacy interests of a
student will be invaded no more than is necessary to achieve the legitimate end of preserving
order in the schools. Id. at 343.
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justified at its inception; and (2) if the search, as conducted, was reasonably related
in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.52
The scope of the search is permissible when the measures adopted are reasonably
related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.53
In applying the twofold test to the search at hand, Justice White upheld the assis-
tant principals search as reasonable.54 The assistant principals search was justified
at its inception, because T.L.O. denied the accusation of smokingon school grounds,
and the presence of cigarettes in T.L.O.s purse would support the eyewitnesss
testimony.55 The assistant principal could reasonablybelieve that such a search would
produce evidence of a violation of school policies.56 Upon removing the cigarettes
and viewing the rolling papers, the assistant principal was within a reasonable
scope to continue to search for other drug paraphernalia.57 The Court concluded that
the search did not violate the students constitutional rights.58 This test is still
applied today.
C. Subsequent Developments in School Searches Following T.L.O.
In 1995 and again in 2002, the Court recognized the diminished expectation of
privacy in regards to the drug testing of public school students.59 In Vernonia School
52 Id. at 341 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)). [A] search of a student by
a teacher or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable
grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school. Id. at 34142 (footnote omitted).
53 Id. at 342.
54 Id. at 34547.
55 Id. at 34546.
56 Id. The Court rejected the New Jersey Supreme Courts argument that the contents of
T.L.O.s purse had no bearing on the accusation against T.L.O. because the possession of
cigarettes did not violate school rules because:
T. L. O. had been accused of smoking, and had denied the accusation
in the strongest possible terms when she stated that she did not smoke
at all. Surely it cannot be said that under these circumstances, T. L. O.s
possession of cigarettes would be irrelevant to the charges against her
or to her response to those charges. T. L. O.s possession of cigarettes,
once it was discovered, would both corroborate the report that she had
been smoking and undermine the credibility of her defense to the charge
of smoking.
Id. at 345.
57 Id. at 347. The Court even held that it was reasonable to extend the search to a separate
zippered compartment of the purse. Id.
58 Id. at 34748.
59 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646 (1995).
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District 47J v. Acton, the Court upheld the random drug testing of student athletes.60
In Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
County v. Earls, the Court upheld the drug testing of all students that participated
in after-school activities.61 Although both cases dealt with suspicionless searches,
instead of the individualized suspicion in T.L.O., they are still helpful in evaluat-
ing the level of intrusion allowed into a students expectation of privacy.62 By
choosing to go out for the team or participating in other school-sanctioned activ-
ities, the students open themselves up to an even lower expectation of privacy.63
Based on this further diminution of privacy, the drug tests were negligible64 or
minimal65 additional intrusions. The Court also explained that [d]eterring drug
use by our Nations schoolchildren heightened the governmental concern at issue
in both cases.66
The most recent school search case to go to the Supreme Court was Safford
Unified School District No. 1 v. Redding.67 In that case, a middle school student made
a report to the assistant principal that an eighth grader was distributing pills to her
60 515 U.S. at 665.
61 536 U.S. at 838.
62 These two cases deal with suspicionless drug testing, while T.L.O. was a search based
on individualized suspicion. The test for reasonableness is different: a court reviews the
persons (or in these two cases, a group of persons) legitimate expectation of privacy, the
degree of intrusion into that privacy interest, and the nature and immediacy of the govern-
mental concern at issue in the case. Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. 646, and Earls, 536 U.S. 822,
with T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325. The cases are still useful in determining the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy of a student in school because the Court would not go as far to say that sus-
picionless testing would work for all students; but, because these students participated in
extracurricular activities, their expectation of privacy was further diminished. See generally
A. James Spung, Comment, From Backpacks to BlackBerries: (Re)Examining New Jersey v.
T.L.O. in the Age of the Cell Phone, 61 EMORY L.J. 111 (2011) (arguing that modern tech-
nology has eroded the foundations of T.L.O.).
63 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (Legitimate privacy expectations are even less with regard
to student athletes. School sports . . . require suiting up before each practice or event, and
showering and changing afterwards. . . . As the . . . Seventh Circuit has noted, there is an ele-
ment of communal undress inherent in athletic participation . . . . (citation omitted)); Earls,
536 U.S. at 83132 ([S]tudents who participate in competitive extracurricular activities
voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes.
Some of these clubs and activities require occasional off-campus travel and communal
undress. All of them have their own rules and requirements for participating students that do
not apply to the student body as a whole. (footnote omitted)).
64 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
65 Earls, 536 U.S. at 834.
66 Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 661 (That the nature of the concern is importantindeed,
perhaps compellingcan hardly be doubted.); Earls, 536 U.S. at 834 ([T]he nationwide
drug epidemic makes the war against drugs a pressing concern in every school.).
67 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
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classmates.68 Similar to T.L.O., the girl, Savana, denied any involvement, and the
assistant principal sought to search her belongings for evidence of a school policy
violation.69 After searching Savanas backpack and outer clothing to no avail, the as-
sistant principal instructed the girl to go to the nurses office.70 While in the nurses
office, Savana was instructed to remove all clothing except for her underwear.71 This
search again produced no evidence of wrongdoing, and Savana was allowed to leave.72
Upon returning home from school, Savana told her mother about the search, and
the mother sued the school district for a violation of her daughters Fourth Amend-
ment rights.73 First, the Court stated that the search was justified at its inception
because of the allegations against the student.74 Ultimately, the Court decided the
search was unreasonable because of the excessively intrusive nature of the strip
search.75 The Court stated that the student had a high level of expectation of privacy
as to her undergarments and that the administrators had no reason to believe that she
was hiding the pills in her underwear.76 Moreover, the schools interest was lowered
because the assistant principal knew that the pills he was searching for were an over-
the-counter medication.77
68 Id. at 368. The report filed initially identified another student, not the party to the case,
as the drug dealer. Id. at 372. The assistant principal searched that student and found a day
planner with pills and several knives, lighters, a permanent marker, and a cigarette. Id. at
368. This student denied involvement and pointed the finger at Savana Redding. Id. at 372.
Before searching Savana, the assistant principal conducted a similar strip search on this
drug dealing student, which also produced no other pills. Id. at 373.
69 Id. at 368. Savana informed the assistant principal that she lent her day planner to a
friend a few days before and said the items belonged to her. Id. This was the student who
accused Savana. Id.
70 Id. at 369.
71 Id. The search was conducted in front of the administrative assistant and the nurse,
both females. Id.
72 Id. (Savana was told to pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull out
the elastic on her underpants, thus exposing her breasts and pelvic area to some degree. No
pills were found.).
73 Id.
74 Id. at 373. Even though the assistant principal had conflicting reports, and a previous
search with no results, the Court concluded that he had reasonable suspicion to search
Savanas backpack and outer clothing. Id.
75 Id. at 37576. There is language in the Courts opinion stating that a strip search of a
student could be allowed in other cases: The indignity of the search does not, of course,
outlaw it . . . . Id. at 375. Moreover, no evidence in the record suggests any reasonable
conclusion that Savana presently had the pills on her person, much less in her underwear.
Id. at 376.
76 Id.
77 Id. The Court stated that evidence of a vast amount of over-the-counter medicationor evi-
dence of illegal narcotics would increase the governmental concern. Id. at 37576. This sliding
scale has been absent from previous case law, but it should not have an effect on this Note.
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II. CELL PHONES IN SCHOOL ZONES
A. Statistics on Cell Phone Use and School Policies
As of 2013, 78% of teenagers have a cell phone, and 47% of those teenagers
have a cell phone which is considered a smartphone.78 In a 2010 study on cell phone
use in schools, 77% of teenage students reported that they brought their cell phones
onto school grounds each day.79 Of the teens that bring their cell phones to school,
64% said that they have texted during class.80 Some students have reported using a
cell phone to cheat on a school assignment.81
In a recent poll of teenagers about school policies on cell phones, the study found
that 12% of all students say they can have their phone at school at any time, 62%
of all students say they can have their phone in school, just not in class, and 24% of
teens attend schools that ban all cell phones from school grounds.82 For school dis-
tricts that allow a student to bring a cell phone onto school grounds, most school
boards require the students to keep the cell phone turned off during class hours.83
Schools implement these types of policies so that students can contact parents fol-
lowing after-school activities or if an emergency occurs.84 Other schools allow cell
78 See MADDEN ET AL., supra note 1. A smartphone is defined as a cellular phone with
internet capabilities (among other technological advances). Definition of: Smartphone, PC
MAG., http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/51537/smartphone [http://perma.cc/27GN
-LV7V]; see also AMANDA LENHART ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TEENS AND MOBILE
PHONES 76 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP-Teens
-and-Mobile-2010-with-topline.pdf [http://perma.cc/TKN9-RD8P] (Most American teenagers
get their first cell phone in middle school, at age 12 or 13: 23% of teens got their first cell
phone at age 12 and another 23% got their first phone at age 13. About 20% of teens have
their first phone by the time they enter middle school (age 11 or under for first cell phone
owned). Another 14% of teens get their first phone at age 14 and roughly 20% get their first
phone when theyre between 15 and 17.).
79 See LENHART ET AL., supra note 78, at 82 ([A]nother 7% take their phone to school
at least several times a week. Less than 10% of teens take their phone to school less often
and just 8% say they never take their phone to school.).
80 Id. at 4.
81 See id. at 85 ([C]heating is carried out through the cell phone by texting test answers
to others, taking pictures of exams, taking pictures of textbook materials to bring into an exam,
and getting answers online . . . .).
82 Id. at 4.
83 See, e.g., Electronics/Cell Phone Use Policy, BENICIA HIGH SCH. (last visited Mar. 3,
2016) [hereinafter BENICIAPOLICY],http://bhs.beniciaunified.org/our-school/attendance-pro
cedures-1/electronics-cell-phone-use; DARLINGTON CTY. SCH. DIST., HARTSVILLE HIGH
SCHOOL CELL PHONE POLICY (2014), http://hhs.dcsdschools.org/UserFiles/Servers/Server
_3842348/Image/Cell%20Phone%20Policy%20-%20One%20Page.pdf [http://perma.cc /HK9T
-JWK6].
84 See, e.g., L.A. UNIFIED SCH. DIST., PARENT-STUDENT HANDBOOK 5 (20132014)
[hereinafter L.A.POLICY], http://home.lausd.net/pdf/Families_Forms/2013-2014_Parent_Stu
dent_Handbook.pdf [http://perma.cc/DEC8-SU7S].
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phones on the premises and allow each teacher to implement his or her own policy
regarding cell phone use.85 Of the schools allowing cell phones subject to certain re-
strictions, the normal policy allows for the confiscation of the cell phone if a student
improperly uses the phone.86
Cell phones are prevalent and cause major problems in schools today because
they distract students, allow them to cheat on assignments, or even encourage cyber-
bullying. While school districts are trying to prevent students from bringing a phone
to class, those policies often do not work. Of those polled, 24% reported that their
school bans cell phones on school grounds, but 65% of those students reported that
they still brought their cell phone with them to school.87 Many more school systems
just limit students from bringing cell phones into the classrooms, but these efforts
produce the same results as outright bans.88 Teachers have to do something to prevent
the distraction. The use of cell phones in classrooms has led to confiscations, and, in
certain instances, the school administrators have searched the confiscated phones.89
B. Klump, Desoto County, and Owensboro Cases90
The next three cases involve a school officials search of a students confiscated
cell phone. All three cases follow the two-prong test from T.L.O., but they have in-
consistent results.
In Klump v. Nazareth Area School District,91 a students cell phone accidently
fell out of his pocket while he was in class.92 The teacher brought the phone to the
85 See, e.g., Bring Your Own Device Policy, BORDENTOWN REGIONAL HIGH SCH., http://
www.bordentown.k12.nj.us/BRHS.cfm?subpage=314012 [http://perma.cc/3WC5-JH76] (Stu-
dents may use devices in class at the teachers discretion. (emphasis omitted)).
86 See BENICIA POLICY, supra note 83; L.A. POLICY, supra note 84.
87 See LENHART ET AL., supra note 78, at 4.
88 See id. at 83 (Just one-quarter of teens (23%) who take their phones to school say they
never have them turned on during the school day.).
89 See infra Part II.B.
90 These are not the only instances of student cell phone searches. Many cases settle
before trial, for example, Stipulated Order of Dismissal, N.N. v. Tunkhannock Area Sch. Dist.,
No. 3:10-cv-1080 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2012), or do not answer the specific question presented
in this Note. See, e.g., Koch v. Adams, 361 S.W.3d 817 (Ark. 2010) (arguing conversion and
trespass for student cell phone confiscations); Bohnert v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of S.F.,
No. 14-cv-02854-WHO, 2015 WL 5652647 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2015) (claiming hostile en-
vironment harassment and infliction of emotional distress). Other instances are presumably
never reported to authorities. These cases, however, can be useful in demonstrating the prob-
lem of cell phones in schools and how school systems struggle to address the issue.
91 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
92 Id. at 630. In this case, [t]he high school ha[d] a policy which permit[ted] students to
carry, but not use or display cell phones during school hours. . . . Christophers cell phone
fell out of his pocket and came to rest on his leg. Upon seeing Christophers cell phone, . . . a
teacher at the high school[ ] enforced the school policy prohibiting [the] use or display of cell
phones by confiscating the phone. Id.
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main office, where school officials then searched the phone.93 Without any knowledge
of other wrongdoing, school officials attempted to contact nine other students to see
who else was using their phone and thus violating school policy.94 The court deter-
mined that the search was justified, but that it was not reasonable in its scope because
it searched for other students misconduct.95 The school officials hoped to utilize
his phone as a tool to catch other students violations, and it is evident that there
must be some basis for initiating a search.96 Thus, the search failed on prong two
of the T.L.O. test because the school officials had no evidence of misconduct on the
part of the student except for the violation of school policy by having the phone
visible.97 The court did not rule out, however, that a cell phone search could never be
justified. The court seemed to indicate that had the officials known of the drug-related
text message before the search began, then the search could have been justified.98
In J.W. v. Desoto County School District,99 the students cell phone was seized
and searched by school officials after witnessing the student reading a text message
from his father on school grounds.100 School officials found gang pictures on the
phone, and the school ultimately expelled the student.101 His mother filed a constitu-
tional claim for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and a claim for unlawful
expulsion.102 The court noted that [u]pon witnessing a student improperly using a
cell phone at school, it [was] reasonable for a school official to seek to determine to
what end the student was improperly using that phone.103 The court found a blanket
search of cell phones to be reasonable when a student intentionally violates school
policy.104 The court reviewed Klump, but distinguished the present case from Klump
because the plaintiff intentionally violated school policy in this case, thus further
93 Id.
94 Id. The school officials later stated that they found drug-related text messages on the
phone, which prompted the subsequent searches into the other students. Id. at 631.
95 Id. at 640.
96 Id. at 64041.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 No. 2:09-cv-00155-MPM-DAS, 2010 WL 4394059 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 2010).
100 Id. at *1.
101 Id. at *2.
102 Id. at *1.
103 Id. at *4. The court reasoned:
For example, it may well be the case that the student was engaged in
some form of cheating, such as by viewing information improperly
stored in the cell phone. It is also true that a student using his cell phone
at school may reasonably be suspected of communicating with another
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diminishing his expectation of privacy.105 Desoto County hinged on the degree of the
violation of the school policy, but the degree of violation was wholly absent from the
majoritys opinion in T.L.O.106
In G.C. v. Owensboro Public Schools,107 there were two searches of a students
cell phone.108 In the first instance, the student went to the principals office and told
the principal that he was very depressed, and then the principal searched the students
cell phone to check for suicidal tendencies.109 The principal knew that the student had
a history of problems in school that led to mental treatment, but she did not find any
specific evidence on the students phone; the Sixth Circuit concluded this search was
reasonable.110 In the second instance, a teacher confiscated the students cell phone
after watching the student use it in school, which was subsequently searched.111 The
school system argued that it had reasonable suspicion to search the text messages
because the student was a drug abuser with suicidal tendencies known to the school
official conducting the search.112
The court rejected the finding in Desoto County of a blanket allowance for a
search of a cell phone if seized pursuant to an intentional violation of a school policy
105 Id. at *5.
The school officials in Klump appeared to use that accident as a pre-
text to conduct a wholesale fishing expedition into the students per-
sonal life, in such a manner as to clearly raise valid Fourth Amendment
concerns. . . . [B]y contrast, plaintiff . . . admits that R.W. knowingly
violated school rules by evenbringing his phone on school grounds, and
he compounded that violation by deciding to actually use the phone
at school.
Id. The judge here seems to believe that the two casesKlump and Desoto Countyare
consistent with each other. But see G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Sch., 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013).
106 Cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 377 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (This standard will permit teachers and school administrators to search stu-
dents when they suspect that the search will reveal evidence of even the most trivial school
regulation or precatory guideline for student behavior. The Courts standard for deciding
whether a search is justified at its inception treats all violations of the rules of the school as
though they were fungible. For the Court, a search for curlers and sunglasses in order to enforce
the school dress code is apparently just as important as a search for evidence of heroin addic-
tion or violent gang activity. (footnote omitted)). But see Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 37577 (2009) (holding that indignity does not outlaw a search). The
Court seems to suggest that the level of intrusiveness is a sliding scale based on the nature of
the infraction committed by the student. Id. at 376.
107 711 F.3d 623 (6th Cir. 2013).
108 Id. at 62728. The two instances took place six months apart and were conducted by two
different school officials. Id.
109 Id. at 627.
110 Id. at 632.
111 Id. at 634. The teacher caught the student texting, confiscated the phone, and then turned
the phone over to an assistant principal. Id.
112 Id. at 633.
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and ruled that the school system did not have reasonable suspicion to search the cell
phone.113 The court stated that, based on the facts at the time of the search (sitting in
class and texting), there was no evidence that the defendant was involved in drug
activity or suicidal thoughts.114 Even with the knowledge of previous drug abuse and
suicidal tendencies, the court reasoned that there must be more for a search in this
specific instance.115 In rejecting the broad approach in Desoto County, the court con-
clude[d] that the fact-based approach taken in Klump more accurately reflects [the]
courts standard than the blanket rule set forth in Desoto.116
These three rulings demonstrate how the courts are struggling with the topic.
Different outcomes could lead to confusion in school systems as to what they are
legally entitled to do and which policies to implement. It is perfectly reasonable to
think that the school officials in the previous three cases would not be alone in their
actions. Many school officials would conduct the same types of searches. Based on
the facts in each instance, it would be difficult to determine if the student gave a
school official the necessary justifications for a search. Looking into the school vio-
lation involved, previous history of the student, and other evidence known at the time
are not suitable elements for the school setting. The reason for the special needs excep-
tion in the school setting is to provide ease for schools to maintain order, but, with
differing outcomes in this area of law, every school search of a cell phone could re-
quire a school official to make a fact-based inquiry. School officials are not equipped
for this, which is precisely why the warrant and probable cause requirement were
reduced. Keeping the current standard and allowing searches will ultimately lead to
a flood of litigation.
III. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
In Riley v. California,117 the Supreme Court gave a blanket rule for searches of
a cell phone incident to arrest: Our answer to the question of what police must do
before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simpleget
a warrant.118 The Court did not, however, rule out the possibility of a warrantless
search of a cell phone under the exigent circumstances exception.119
113 Id. at 63334.
114 Id. at 634.
115 Id. at 63334.
116 Id. at 633.
117 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
118 Id. at 2495. This case combined two fact patterns, but the facts of the casesinvolving
the level of intrusion of the searchare wholly irrelevant because of the blanket rule an-
nounced. Id. at 248082.
119 Id. at 2494 (In light of the availability of the exigent circumstances exception, there is
no reason to believe that law enforcement officers will not be able to address some of the more
extreme hypotheticals. . . .). This exception basically allows police officersin emergencies
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The Court first reviewed the historical significance of the search incident to arrest
exception, concluding that the underlying rationales for the exception were the govern-
mental interests in protecting the arresting officer and preventing the destruction of
evidence.120 The nature of cell phones, however, forced the court to reconsider the
rationales.121 Cell phones were not present or even conceivable when the exception
was conceptualized, so the Court relied on precedent when dealing with new catego-
ries of effects searched:
Absent more precise guidance from the founding era, we gen-
erally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from
the warrant requirement by assessing, on the one hand, the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individuals privacy and, on the other,
the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests. . . . Such a balancing of interests sup-
ported the search incident to arrest exception in Robinson, and a
mechanical application of Robinson might well support the war-
rantless searches at issue here.
. . . [However] a search of the information on a cell phone bears
little resemblance to the type of brief physical search considered
in Robinson.
. . . .
[Therefore we must] consider each Chimel concern in turn . . .
[and] ask . . . whether application of the search incident to arrest
doctrine to this particular category of effects would untether the
rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel exception.122
onlyto conduct a warrantless search because it is infeasible and even dangerous to obtain
a warrant. See, e.g., id. (giving examples of exigent circumstances).
120 Id. at 248384. The following quote from Chimel v. California, 359 U.S. 752 (1969),
outlined the rationales:
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the
officers safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated.
In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestees person in order to prevent its
concealment or destruction. . . . There is ample justification, therefore,
for a search of the arrestees person and the area within his immediate
controlconstruing that phrase to mean the area from within which he
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
Id. at 76263.
121 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
122 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 248485 (citations omitted).
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The Court quickly dispensed with the first Chimel rationale because the arrestee
cannot use a cell phone as a weapon in a direct way.123 The second Chimel rationale
produced more debate because of the possibility of remote wiping of the cell phones
data.124 The Court, however, also found this argument unpersuasive because remote
wiping is not prevalent, and police can implement procedures to protect a phone from
remote wipe attempts, for example, Faraday Bags.125 Both governmental interests
were absent in the cell phone context, but the Court still had to review the persons
privacy interests at stake.126
With an arrestees reduced privacy interests upon being taken into police cus-
tody, an inspection constituted only minor additional intrusions compared to the
substantial government authority exercised in taking [the arrestee] into custody.127
Even though an arrestee has a diminished expectation of privacy in his person and ef-
fects, it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment falls out of the picture entirely . . .
when privacy-related concerns are weighty enough [that] a search may require a war-
rant, notwithstanding the diminished expectations of privacy of the arrestee.128 The
Government tried to assert that the content searches in United States v. Robinson129
a previous search incident to arrest case where the contents of a cigarette package
found on an arrestee were searchedwas materially indistinguishable from searches
of a cell phone; it returned a quick refusal from the Court.130
Before cell phones, a search incident to arrest was limited to what the arrestee
physically carried.131 Cell phones differ from those objects, requiring a review of an
123 Id. at 248586.
124 Id. at 2486.
125 Id. at 248688 (Remote wiping [also] can be fully prevented by disconnecting a phone
from the network.). Faraday bags are a type of bag that is usually lined with aluminum foil
to prevent outside signals from interfering with the device inside the bag. Brief of Criminal
Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Riley and Respondent Wurie at 34, Riley, 134
S. Ct. 2473 (No. 99-55532).
126 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 248889.
127 Id. at 2488.
128 Id. (citations omitted).
129 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
130 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488. The majoritys response to that characterization:
That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable
from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to
point B, but little else justifies lumping them together. Modern cell
phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns far beyond those im-
plicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. A con-
clusion that inspecting the contents of an arrestees pockets works no
substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may
make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that rea-
soning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.
Id. at 248889.
131 Id. at 2488.
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arrestees reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her cell phone.132 The Court
stated that a person can carry a vast amount of personal information on a cell phone,
and the search would not be physically limited as in previous cases:
The storage capacity of cell phones has several interrelated
consequences for privacy. First, a cell phone collects in one place
many distinct types of informationan address, a note, a pre-
scription, a bank statement, a videothat reveal much more in
combination than any isolated record. Second, a cell phones ca-
pacity allows even just one type of information to convey far
more than previously possible. The sum of an individuals pri-
vate life can be reconstructed through a thousand photographs
labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be
said of a photograph or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.
Third, the data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the
phone, or even earlier. . . .
. . . .
Although the data stored on a cell phone is distinguished
from physical records by quantity alone, certain types of data are
also qualitatively different. An Internet search and browsing his-
tory, for example, can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and
could reveal an individuals private interests or concerns . . . .
. . . .
In 1926, Learned Hand observed (in an opinion later quoted
in Chimel) that it is a totally different thing to search a mans
pockets and use against him what they contain, from ransacking
his house for everything which may incriminate him. . . . If his
pockets contain a cell phone, however, that is no longer true. . . .
[A] cell phone search would typically expose to the government
far more than the most exhaustive search of a house: A phone
not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previ-
ously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private
information never found in a home in any formunless the
phones is.133
132 Id. at 2489.
133 Id. at 248991 (citation omitted). The government also asked for the officers to have
the ability to search cell phone data if they could have obtained the same information from
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The Court concluded that absent the original justifications for a search incident
to arrest, the governmental concerns for a warrantless search did not outweigh the
heightened privacy interests in ones cell phone.134
IV. THE EFFECTS OF RILEY IN THE SCHOOL ZONE
Riley demonstrates that the nature of cell phones should bring caution to a courts
decision about a search of a cell phone. The opinion has effect only in the search inci-
dent to arrest context, but it should offer guidance in other areas in which warrant-
less searches are allowed. The main focus is technological advances, and, when the
courts first decided these issues, the technology [was] nearly inconceivable.135
A. Riley Requires the Court to Re-weigh the Balancing Test
Even though there is a set standard for determining the reasonableness of a
warrantless search in the school context, a court should re-weigh the balancing test.
There was a set standard for determining the reasonableness of a warrantless search
in the search incident to arrest context, but that did not stop the Court from re-exam-
ining the original justifications of the exception.136 The technology at issue in
Rileya cell phonewas the driving factor in the determination to re-weigh the
balance of interests:137 the same technologya cell phoneshould produce the same
result of re-weighing the interests in other exceptions to the warrant requirement of
the Fourth Amendment.
In Riley, the Court could have followed the original search incident to arrest
rule,138 but decided to review the original rationales for the exception to see if they
a pre-digital counterpart, but the Court differentiated cell phone searches from those of
letters, mail, and address books that could be found on a person in the time of Chimel,
because no one person would carry all that information on his or her person at one time. Id.
at 2493.
134 Id. It is a good time to point out that the Riley Court did not look to any other possible
governmental interests in a warrantless search of an arrestee. The Court conducted the bal-
ancing test solely with the existing/original justifications in play. The balancing test weighs
governmental interests; however, it does not distinguish between predetermined justifications
and newjustifications. It is hard, however, to imagine another governmental interest, but there
could be some out there. In his concurrence, Justice Alito takes up this point: he looks to the
common law on this issue before the Chimel rationale was determined. He stated that the gov-
ernment had an interest at common law for all evidence on an arrestee, and it did not matter if
destruction was imminent. Id. at 2495 (Alito, J., concurring). Based on this rationale, this Note
will only conduct the balancing test with regard to the original justifications from T.L.O.
135 Id. at 2484.
136 See supra Part III.
137 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
138 Police were allowed to search anything in the arrestees reach to protect the arresting
officer or to prevent the destruction of evidence. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
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werestill present.139 TheCourt determined it was compelled to conduct a newbalancing
test because the technology at issue was not present when the original cases were de-
cided, and the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.140
The re-weighing should also be done in public schools for searches of a students
cell phone. Currently, courts have allowed a warrantless search of a cell phone based
on the original rule from T.L.O.141 Following Riley (as well as other cases), this is not
the correct process because the cell phone technology was not present when T.L.O.
was decided.142 The courts, because of the unique characteristics of cell phones, should
review the underlying rationales for allowing warrantless searches in schools. A court
facing this problem should weigh the governmental interests in protecting order and
maintaining discipline in schools against a students reasonable expectation of privacy
in her cell phone.143 This is always the test conducted when a new problem faces the
Court under the Fourth Amendment.144
(1973) (The first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of
the lawful arrest. The second is that a search may be made of the area within the control of
the arrestee.).
139 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
140 Id. at 248284 (citation omitted) (Absent more precise guidance from the founding
era, we generally determine whether to exempt a given type of search from the warrant re-
quirement by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individuals
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests. (citation omitted)); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27,
3334 (2001) (It would be foolish to contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens
by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance of technology.);
Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299300 (1999) (In determining whether a particular
governmental action violate[d] [the Fourth Amendment], we inquire first whether the action
was regarded as an unlawful search or seizure under the common law when the Amendment
was framed. . . . Where that inquiry yields no answer, we must evaluate the search or seizure
under traditional standards of reasonableness . . . . (citations omitted)).
141 See, e.g., G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Sch., 711 F.3d 623, 632 (6th Cir. 2013).
142 Remember, the Court distinguished searches of other tangible items (whichwere present
at the time the exception was made) from searches of cell phones (which were not present at
the time the exception was made). See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 248889.
143 For an explanation of why the courts should only use these governmental interests, see
Part II. Just as in the case of the search incident to arrest exception, it might not be that this is a
part of the framework of analysis, but that there is no other governmental interests involved.
144 See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484; Houghton, 526 U.S. at 300; Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J
v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 65253 (1995) ([I]n a case such as this, where there was no clear
practice, either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the time the constitu-
tional provision was enacted, whether a particular search meets the reasonableness standard is
judged by balancing its intrusion on the individuals Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. (footnote omitted)). Because of Riley, a fed-
eral district court in Maryland, considering a warrantless search of electronics pursuant to the
border exception, re-weighed the governmental interests against the persons expectation of
privacy in his electronics. See United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815 (D. Md. 2014).
The case is discussed further in Part V, along with other cases that support the proposition.
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In the most recent case involving a search of a students cell phone, District
Court Judge Gibney of the Eastern District of Virginia asked the parties to brief the
court on the possible implications of Riley.145 In that case, school officials received
a tip that a student was smoking marijuana on school grounds.146 The school officials
called the student into the main office and subsequentlysearched his backpack, shoes,
pockets, and cell phone.147 Following T.L.O., Judge Gibney found that the search of
the backpack, shoes, and pockets was justified at its inception and reasonably related
in scope to that justification because the school officials could have found drugs in
these places.148 When reviewing the search of the cell phone, the court found that it
was not reasonably related in scope, because the cell phone could not have con-
tained drugs.149
Even though Judge Gibney asked the parties to write briefs to the court based
on Riley, he did not refer to Riley in his opinion.150 Judge Gibney even stated that the
search could have been justified if there were more facts to support a cell phone
search.151 It is hard to determine why Riley did not factor into the judges opinion, but
the plaintiffs brief did not fully articulate an argument based on the impact of Riley
the brief argued that since the Fourth Amendment applies to both law enforcement
officials and school officials, so should Riley.152 In the brief for the school administra-
tors, the lawyers argued that Riley does not apply because it is only applicable to law
enforcement officers when a person is being searched incident to an arrest.153 The
defendants brief conceded that the legality of a search of a student should depend
simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search, but they
stated that the T.L.O. decision described what is reasonable in the school search
145 Gallimore ex rel. W.S.G. v. Henrico Cty. Sch. Bd., 38 F. Supp. 3d 721 (E.D. Va.
2014); see also Mark Walsh, Judge Rejects Administrators Search of Students Cellphone,
EDUC.WK.:SCH. L. (Sept. 12, 2014, 9:19 AM), http://blogs.edweek.org/edweek/school_law
/2014/09/judge_rejects_administrators_s.html.
146 Gallimore, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 724.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 72425.
149 Id. at 725.
150 See generally id.
151 Id. at 725 n.4 (The Court does not suggest that [the school official] did not have
reasonable cause to check the cell phones contents. For instance, she could have had reason
to suspect that text messages or telephone calls stored in the phone would disclose a mari-
juana supplier or purchaser in the school. On the record before the Court, however, no such
facts justify the search. She may, of course, assert additional facts in a motion for summary
judgment, when the Court will view both sides of the case.).
152 Plaintiffs Further Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss at 56, Gallimore, 38
F. Supp. 3d 721 (No. 3:14cv009). The plaintiff only argued about reasonableness, not how
the balancing test factored into determining reasonableness. Id.
153 Defendants Further Support of Motion to Dismiss at 3, Gallimore, 38 F. Supp. 3d 721
(No. 3:14cv009).
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context.154 That statement is correct with respect to searches of tangible items in
schools, but it fails to factor in the new technology. Riley and similar cases involving
novel issues pertaining to technologyin the context of the Fourth Amendment require
a court to conduct a balancing test which is the ultimate touchstone of reasonable-
ness under the Fourth Amendment.
Riley is not the first case dealing with a new technology and the Fourth Amend-
ment.155 In 2001, the Supreme Court recognized the need to evolve Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence in the face of advancing technology.156 In Kyllo, a police officer
was outside the defendants homethe defendant was a suspected drug dealerand
conducted thermal imaging of the home.157 The Court determined that this was a
search, and therefore police needed a warrant.158 Previous case law stated that police
observingfrom a public areaactivity that is exposed to the public is not a search
under the Fourth Amendment.159 The heat emanating from the home was being ex-
posed to the public, but the Court stated that [i]t would be foolish to contend that the
degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance[ment] of technology.160 The Court refused to apply
former rules of the Fourth Amendment in the face of technology.161
In two additional cases, the Court reviewed established Fourth Amendment rules
in the face of technology.162 In United States v. Jones, the Court determined that when
police place a GPS tracking device on a vehicle, it constitutes a search.163 The Court
previously held that the police could place a beeper on an effect (a barrel placed in the
154 Id. at 3 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 34142 (1985)).
155 The first two cases (Kyllo and Jones) deal with the definition of a search and its
interplay with technology. The cases determine whether the police conduct amounts to a search
under the Fourth Amendment. Riley and the school search cases are searches within the defini-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, but are based on exceptions to the warrant requirement. Com-
pare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), and United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945
(2012), with Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). The cases have no bearing on each
other but are useful in looking to how the Court evolves Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
in the face of technology. See also infra Part V (describing cases following Riley, which use
the same framework).
156 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 3334.
157 Id. at 30. While sitting in his car, the detective scanned the house with the thermal imager.
This process does not showwhat is happening inside the home; it only shows the heat emanat-
ing from the home. Id. at 29.
158 Id. at 40.
159 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).
160 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 3334.
161 Id. at 34.
162 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that the use of a GPS tracking
device to monitor a vehicle is a search); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013) (holding
that the use of a buccal swab to obtain a defendants DNA after an arrest for a serious offense
is constitutional).
163 132 S. Ct. at 949.
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back of defendants car), but distinguished Jones on the fact of common law trespass.164
In Maryland v. King, the Court determined that police could obtain an arrestees DNA
without a warrant.165 In that case, the Courtonce againconducted a balancing test
of the individuals privacy concerns versus the governmental interests in a war-
rantless search.166 The outcome is different than in Riley because the governmental
interest, trying to identify the arrestee, is still present.167 Scholars suggest that the dif-
ferent outcomes are based on the level of information gleaned from the new technol-
ogy compared to the original case168just as Riley did when rejecting the argument
that a search of a cell phone was similar to a search of any other tangible item pres-
ent on an arrestee.169
These additional Fourth Amendment cases show the need to review original
jurisprudence of the Fourth Amendment in the face of new technology. Kyllo and
Jones demonstrated a new test for what constitutes a search because of the technol-
ogy involved. King showed that Riley was not the first case when the Court con-
ducted a re-weighing of the balancing test because of the technology involved.
B. Governmental Interests for Warrantless Searches in Public Schools
For public schools, the main reason for allowing a warrantless search is to pro-
tect the safety of schoolchildren and to maintain order and discipline in the schools.170
164 Id. at 952. In the previous case allowing this type of intrusion, the Court stated that
placing a beeper in a barrel bought by the defendant was not a search because the beeper just
revealed the places the defendant was traveling on public roads, thus exposing it to the pub-
lic. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 28485 (1983). The Court in Jones distinguished
the two because Jones was already in possession of the car when police placed the beeper on
itthus a trespass violationwhile Knotts did not own the item when the police placed the
beeper in it. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
165 133 S. Ct. at 1980 (referring to the search incident to arrest exception).
166 Id. at 1970. The Court held that the DNA profile was essential in determining who the
arrestee is and offered no different information than fingerprints or photographs. Id. at 1980.
167 Id.
168 See AndrewPincus, Evolving Technologyand the Fourth Amendment: The Implications
of Riley v. California, 20132014 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 307, 308, 320 (The difference in out-
come between [King] and Kyllo and Jones stems directly from the Courts analysis of the na-
ture of the information gained through DNA analysis. Because the new technology was simply
a more accurate means of ascertaining the arrestees identity and prior criminal historyand
did not reveal other types of personal informationthe Court concluded that additional Fourth
Amendment protection was not warranted.). Alitoin his Jones opinionpossibly distin-
guished the beeper technology, which was unreliable, compared to the GPS tracker, which
offered more reliable information as to the defendants whereabouts, based on that reliability.
Id. at 318.
169 See supra Part III.
170 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 34041 (1985). Again, this Note is not suggest-
ing that these are the only governmental interests for a warrantless search in a school, but it
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The educational process would be severely disrupted if school administrators had
to obtain search warrants to investigate every infraction of school policy or of
criminal law.171
Cell phones cause massive disruptions in schools, not only to the students using
them in the classroom, but also to surrounding students who may be distracted by
the children using them. For instance, a child may be texting, surfing the web, play-
ing a game, or cheating on an exam. It is not only distracting to that student, but also
to another student who may witness the child on his or her phone. This may cause the
other student to check his or her own phone or just become fixed on why the child is
using his or her phone. If the teacher witnesses this activity, then the teacher has to
pause instruction to deal with the distraction. The teacher could confiscate the phone
or send the student to the main officeeither way, class time has an unwanted dis-
ruption from the learning process that the students do not get back.
This disruption has caused many school districts to outlaw phones from being
present in schools or some school districts to allow students to bring phones into the
school and have the students store the phones in their lockers.172 If the phone is seen by
a teacher or administrator, the official will confiscate the phone because the teacher
wants to rid the classroom of the unwanted distraction. Upon confiscation, however,
the cell phone is no longer a disruption to the educational process. The cell phone
caused a distraction but is no longer causing a distraction, and it can no longer dis-
rupt order and delay the educational process. Teachers have the ability to maintain
order without having to search the cell phone. There is no reason to search the cell
phone but for the purpose of trying to determine what the student was doing on the
cell phone. Determining if a student was playing a game on his cell phone versus surf-
ing the web is irrelevant to the ability of a school to maintain order. The search sim-
ply does not fit under the T.L.O. justifications; all that is needed is the seizure of the
cell phone.
In Redding, school officials received a report that a student had contraband (pills)
on her body.173 This report gives reasonable suspicion to search the student for the
contraband. With cell phones, it is necessary to think of the cell phone as the contra-
band. There is nothing further to search when the contraband is found.
Consider the following illustration. Student X reports to the principal that two
students are causing a disruption in class. Student X states that the first disruption
is from Student A who is texting answers for the exam to other students. Student X
seems that the balancing test does not look to new factors. Other governmental interests could
be out there, but most would fall under the two original justifications. For example, in Earls
and Acton, the Court stated that curbing the drug problem in schools is of utmost importance,
but this can fall under the safety of schoolchildren justification. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536
U.S. 822 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
171 See, e.g., T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 34041.
172 See supra Part II.A.
173 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368 (2009).
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states that the second disruption is from Student B who has paper copies of the
answer key for the exam and is handing those copies out to students. Both disrup-
tions prevent the teacher from maintaining order in the classroom, but both cannot
be effectively prevented by one confiscation. The teacher can prevent Student As
disruption by confiscating the phone aloneStudent A cannot text answers to the
exam without her phone. If the teacher confiscates one answer key on Student Bs
desk, she must search the backpack or desk or person to see if there are other answer
keys. Student B could have multiple answer keys and keep distributing after the
initial confiscation; Student A cannot. The disruption in Student Bs situation would
not be stopped upon confiscation alone because of the possibility of additional
copies of the exam answers elsewherethere has to be an additional search to end
the disruption.174
The other main justification for warrantless searches in schools is to protect the
children.175 This justification is similar to the justification in the search incident to
arrest exception: conducting a warrantless search to protect the safety of the arresting
officers.176 Just as in Riley, digital data that is stored on a cell phone cannot be used
to physically harm another student.177
There is an argument, however, that the pervasiveness of cyber-bullying is greatly
affecting children today.178 Cyber-bullying is a terrible thing, and school officials
should do whatever is possible to stop it, but investigations of cyber-bullying should
be left to law enforcement. School officials can be on the lookout to report cyber-
bullying and to counsel affected students, but again there is no need for a school
174 It can be argued that both disruptions would cause an additional search. A person might
argue that, in Student As disruption, the teacher would want to search the phone to see the
other students who received the answers from Student A. This would not follow because the
teacher can only search for this particular students misconduct. See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth
Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (holding that a teacher must have a rea-
sonable suspicion based on misconduct to search a cellphone). It would be the same situation
as that of Student Bthe teacher could only search Student Bthe teacher cannot search every
other student in the classroom for the answer key absent individualized suspicion. Further,
the Riley Court rejected a similar argument from the government; the government wanted the
police to search phones if they knew there was evidence relevant to the crime the person was
being arrested for on the phone. See infra Part IV.D.
175 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 33940.
176 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
177 Id.
178 See NaomiHarlinGoodno, HowPublicSchools CanConstitutionallyHaltCyberbullying:
A Model Cyberbullying Policy That Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth
Amendment Challenges, 46WAKEFORESTL.REV.641 (2011) (Schoolyard bullying has been
around for generations, but recently it has taken on a new, menacing facecyberbullying. Now
adolescents use technology to deliberately and repeatedly bully, harass, hassle, and threaten
peers. . . . Adolescents use their cell phones to take photos anytime and anywhere (including
bathrooms) and then instantaneously post them online for others to rate, tag, discuss, and pass
along. Cyberbullying is one of the top challenges facing public schools. (footnotes omitted)).
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search. If there is a great deal of evidence that a student is a cyber-bully, police should
obtain a warrant to search all of the students electronic devices. Upon that report of
cyber-bullying, school administrators can confiscate a students electronic device, but
there is not much else to be done.179 The cyber-bully can no longer bully a student
without his electronic devices, and, once the warrant is obtained, school officials can
turn the devices over to police.
Both justifications for a warrantless search in a school are absent pertaining
to cell phones. Just as in Riley, there could be circumstances that enhance the need
for a warrantless search, but those instances are rare, and, in truly dire circum-
stances, the school administrators could search a phone under the exigent circum-
stances exception.180
C. The Students Expectation of Privacy in a Cell Phone
The next step in the inquiry is to view the students expectation of privacy in his
or her cell phone versus the diminished expectation of privacy a student has when
bringing items onto school grounds. Similar to the diminished expectation of pri-
vacy of an arrestee, public school students have a lessened expectation of privacy
because of their presence on school grounds.181 The student, however, is not deprived
of all protections against invasions of privacy.182 The item that the student wants
to protect against an invasion must be one that society is prepared to recognize
as legitimate.183
The Court just determined that society is prepared to recognize a legitimate
privacy interest in ones cell phone based on the outcome in Riley.184 Since that is the
case, the arrestee and the student have the same legitimate privacy interest in their
cell phones because in each case the phone can carry the same amount of personal
data. A cell phone in the hands of an adult is no different from a cell phone in the
hands of a teenager. Adults and schoolchildren could have different models of a
179 Upon a report of a cyber-bully, the report most likely would come from someone with
knowledge. The person with knowledge could tell administrators everything that has hap-
pened and, if he or she is the person being bullied, could show the accounts of bullying on
his or her own device. The problem could be resolved without the need of a search or a
search warrant.
180 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2494.
181 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
182 See id. at 33738 (We have recognized that even a limited search of the person is a
substantial invasion of privacy. . . . A search of a childs person or of a closed purse or other
bag carried on her person, no less than a similar search carried out on an adult, is undoubt-
edly a severe violation of subjective expectations of privacy. (footnote omitted) (citations
omitted)).
183 Id. at 338 (citation omitted).
184 See supra Part III (emphasizing the fact that officers must get warrants to search cell
phone data because this act constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment).
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phone (younger children could have a rudimentary functioning phone for emergency
calls only), but the Court did not distinguish between phones in Riley.185 There should
be no difference between the personal information on an adults phone compared to
that of a childs.186 Teenagers and adults use their phones in the same way, and both
groups have access to the Internet and other apps.187
Teenagers use their phones for a variety of reasons: to contact their parents, to
speak with friends, to go online, or to post something to their social media accounts.188
Phone conversations and text messages are obviously private, but society may not be
prepared to accept that posts to Facebook are equally private. These problems are not
unique to teenagersmany adults are online and can post the same materials as stu-
dents to their social media accounts from their phones.189 Further, in a study reviewing
privacy settings on social media accounts, the researchers found a negligible differ-
ence between adult and teenager settings.190
In reviewing a persons expectation of privacy in his or her cell phone, the Riley
Court focused on the immense storage capacity of cell phones.191 The Riley Court
stated that the internet browsing history and mobile applications on a persons phone
185 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. In fact, in the two cases that were appealed to the Supreme
Court for the search incident to arrest exception with respect to cell phones, the phones were
not the same. Petitioner Riley was carrying a smart phone. Id. at 2480. The companion case
involved Respondent Wurie, who had an older-functioning flip phone, which could not ac-
cess the internet. Id. at 2481. The Court did not distinguish between the two types of phones
and held that there must be a warrant for all phones. Id. at 249495.
186 See id. at 2489 (emphasizing all that is stored on cell phones); see also infra note 187
and accompanying text. One can even argue that students have more private information on
their phones than adults, but that should not be a factor in the analysis.
187 Compare AMANDA LENHART, PEW RESEARCH CTR.,TEENS,SMARTPHONES &TEXTING
1018 (2012) [hereinafter LENHART, TEENS & SMARTPHONES], http://www.pewinternet.org
/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Teens_Smartphones_and_Texting.pdf [http://perma
.cc/JL8B-Z3KL] (detailing what teenagers do on cell phones), with AMANDA LENHART, PEW
RESEARCH CTR., CELLPHONES AND AMERICAN ADULTS: THEY MAKE JUST AS MANY CALLS,
BUT TEXT LESS OFTEN THAN TEENS 215 (2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old
-media//Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Adults_Cellphones_Report_2010.pdf [http://perma.cc/2CLB
-4VG6] (detailing what adults do on cell phones, which is similar to that of teenagers, but
different amounts of usage).
188 LENHART, TEENS & SMARTPHONES, supra note 187 (detailing teenagers use of their
phones on a daily basis, with the bulk of use in the form of text messages to friends).
189 MAEVE DUGGAN &AARON SMITH, PEWRESEARCH CTR., SOCIALMEDIA UPDATE 2013,
at 1 (2013), http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2013/12/PIP_Social-Networking-2013.pdf [http://
perma.cc/4UAB-KMV6] (Some 73% of online adults now use a social networking site of
some kind.).
190 MARY MADDEN, PEW RES. CTR., PRIVACY MANAGEMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA SITES 6
(2012),http://www.pewinternet.org/files/old-media//Files/Reports/2012/PIP_Privacy_manage
ment_on_social_media_sites_022412.pdf [http://perma.cc/88JX-BCHW] ([W]hen it comes
to basic privacy settings, users of all ages are equally likely to choose a private, semi-private
or public setting for their profile. There are no significant variations across age groups.).
191 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
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heighten rather than diminish the expectation of privacy.192 There is no mention of
posts to social media sites or how they relate to privacy interests.193 Teenagers may
post more online from their phones than adults, but that should not matter when re-
viewing a persons expectation of privacy. Teenagers and adults alike should have
the same expectation of privacy in social media posts from their cell phones. More-
over, Riley did not distinguish between juvenile and adult arrestees, so it is safe to
assume that everyone has the same privacy interests in their phones.
When the exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
were first expressed, the technology available in todays cell phone was nearly
inconceivable.194 The information that is available on a cell phone accessible to gov-
ernmental actors today versus the tangible items available a few decades ago differ[s]
in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense and should heighten the privacy inter-
ests at stake.195
D. The Outcome of the Balancing Test
Riley calls for the weighing of privacy interests versus governmental interests
for warrantless searches of cell phones, but the Riley Court explicitly stated that the
ruling only applied to the search incident to arrest exception.196 Just as in the search
incident to arrest exception for a cell phone search, however, the governmental inter-
ests in a warrantless search of a students cell phone are almost entirely absent.197
Cell phones cannot injure other students, and the phone can cause no more disrup-
tions once it has been taken from the student. After confiscation, there is no justifi-
cation to search the cell phone. It is just a mere fishing expedition.
The government might argue that if school officials reasonably believe that
evidence of a school violation or criminal activity is present on a students phone,
then the school officials should be able to search the phone. This is similar to the
governments argument in Rileythat an officer should be allowed to search a cell
phone for information relevant to the crime committed.198 In Riley, the government
proposed that a warrantless search of a cell phone should be allowed if it is reason-
able to believe that evidence of the crime would be found on the phone.199 The Court
192 Id. at 2490.
193 See generally id. The Court acknowledges that a modern smartphone has these capabil-
ities but does not factor that into their analysis. Id. at 2490.
194 Id. at 2484. Chimel and Robinson were decided over a decade earlier than T.L.O., but the
T.L.O. case was decided on a review of similar tangible items that were present in Robinson.
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 33839 (1985).
195 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
196 Id. at 248990 n.1.
197 See supra Part IV.B.
198 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492.
199 Id.
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rejected this argument because it would impose few meaningful restraints on an
officer.200 This standard should not change for school officials. It would be too
hard for a school administrator to limit the search just for evidence of the particular
violation that justified the search in the first place. If the courts do allow searches
just for a particular crime, it will inevitably lead to some rummaging.201 This would
cause a great deal of litigation and undue burden on the justice system on where to
draw a line.
Both exceptions to the warrant requirement allowed for warrantless searches
because the particular person being searched has a diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in that particular setting.202 There is no literature distinguishing between the
search warrant exceptionsas to if one exception arises to a more diminished expec-
tation of privacy compared to another.203 Moreover, there has been no court opinion
on the issue. It should follow that the persons expectation of privacy is diminished
by the same amount in each of the two particular settings (search incident to arrest
and school search) pertaining to the exceptions to the warrant requirement. If that is
trueand the fact that an arrestee and student have the same expectation of privacy
in their cell phonesthen the expectation of privacy of a students cell phone is
greater than the diminished expectation of privacy of that student on school grounds
combined with the fact that the original justifications are absent. The expectation of
privacy of a cell phone should not change based on the settings.
The heightened privacy interest in the data on a cell phone compels a court to
conclude that the privacy interests outweigh the governmental concerns, which are
absent in this instance.204 There may be some truly exceptional circumstances where
a warrantless search is necessary, but just like police officers in Riley, school offi-
cials can rely on the exigent circumstances exception.
200 Id. (The sources of potential pertinent information are virtually unlimited, so applying
the Gant standard to cell phones would in effect give police officers unbridled discretion to
rummage at will among a persons private effects. (citation omitted)).
201 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 331 (1985).
202 See supra Part I.B; see also supra Part III.
203 Both exceptions limited the governmental actors to some test of reasonableness when
conducting a warrantless search, but for the border exception, there are fewlimits for searches.
See United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 81718 (D. Md. 2014) (highlighting the
fact that routine border searches are permissible without even reasonable suspicion). There-
fore, one can argue that the border involves a greater diminution of privacy than the search inci-
dent to arrest and school exception. There is no corresponding differentiation between the
search incident to arrest exception and the school search exception. Further, courts in the bor-
der exception context have applied Riley. See infra Part V.
204 In King, which re-weighed the search incident to arrest exception pursuant to a new
technology (DNA), the Court found that the governmental interests outweighed the privacy
concerns. Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1976 (2013). The King Court stated that the po-
lice needed to determine who the arrestee is (governmental interest), and that was not a greater
intrusion than fingerprinting. Id. Riley and the school search cases of cell phones have a greater
privacy interest and a reduced governmental interest compared to King.
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V. RECENT RULINGS PERTAINING TO TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES IN
OTHER CATEGORICAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
ARE CONSISTENT WITH THIS NOTE
Following Riley, courts have been constantly reviewing technological advances
with respect to other areas of the Fourth Amendment. There are multiple categorical
exceptions to the warrant requirement, and many cases are coming to the surface that
are similar to Riley. Two particular exceptions are noted in this Section: the border
search exception and the warrantless search of a parolee.
Historically, the border exception to the warrant requirement has allowed border
searches without any probable cause or reasonable suspicion.205 A warrantless search
at the border is justified because the country wants to patrol its territories and to pro-
tect national security.206 A recent Ninth Circuit ruling held that searches of electronic
devices at the border now have to be conducted with reasonable suspicion as com-
pared to the suspicionless searches that the border patrol has historically conducted.207
In contrast, a federal district court upheld a warrantless search of a cell phone at the
border, despite Riley, in United States v. Saboonchi.208
The court in Saboonchi reviewed the case, a cell phone search at the border,
again following Riley on insistence by the defendant.209 Judge Grimm first distin-
guished the search incident to arrest doctrine from the border exception doctrine be-
cause the two were based on different justifications.210 Judge Grimm held that the
original purpose for the border exceptionto protect national securityis still pres-
ent in the face of todays technology.211 Judge Grimm found that the original purpose
205 See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 617 (1977) (detailing the history of the
common law and Fourth Amendment with respect to searches at the border).
206 See id. at 619 (Border searches . . . have been considered to be reasonable by the
single fact that the person or item in question had entered into our country from outside.);
see also Samuel A. Townsend, Note, Laptop Searches at the Border and United States v.
Cotterman, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1745, 1753 (2014) ([P]roponents of the border search exception
argue that it plays a key role in protecting governmental interests in customs, immigration, and
national security.).
207 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding that officers
had reasonable suspicion to search a man when he was stopped at the border because he had
a seventeen-year-old conviction for child molestation and the border patrol agents conducted
a thorough forensic examination of his laptop).
208 United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 819 (D. Md. 2014).
209 Id. at 816.
210 Id. at 81718. The search incident to arrest exceptions justifications are protecting
evidence and the arresting officer; in contrast, the border exceptions justification is protecting
national security. Id.
211 Id. at 819 (This [argument] might have merit if the search incident to arrest and border
search exceptions had the same purpose . . . . But that is not the case.). This Note assumes
that Judge Grimm did not mean that the two exceptions had to have the same purpose; rather,
he meant that the argument might have merit if the two exceptions both had similar justifica-
tions that were absent in the context of technology.
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still outweighs the expectation of privacy that a person who is crossing the border
has in a cell phone.212
In a similar case out of a federal court in the District of Columbia, the court re-
viewed a search of a laptop at the border.213 The court stated, following the approach
utilized in Riley, that it must conduct a balancing test.214 As part of that exercise,
the Court should, as the Supreme Court did [in Riley], consider whether the applica-
tion of the recognized warrant exception to this particular category of personal prop-
erty would untether the rule from the justifications underlying the exception.215
The court then conducted a similar balancing test as the one urged in this Note.216
In another area of the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search of a parolee is
allowed because the state has a compelling interest in reducing recidivism and
promoting reintegration into society.217 Federal courts have reviewed this exception
following Riley, regarding warrantless searches of parolees electronic devices.218
In Johnson, the court reviewed the original justifications for the parole exception,
and one justificationpreventing the disposal of evidencewas present that was
also present in Riley.219 One justification being similar, however, was insufficient to
overcome the other primary justifications that are still present.220 The parolees ar-
gument erred in ignor[ing] the other bases for the parole search exception, and,
with the justifications still present, the test fails.221
These cases are relevant because they implicate other search warrant exceptions
with respect to technology. Before Riley, the Cotterman court recognized a heightened
expectation of privacy in electronic devices in the context of the border search excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.222 Further, the Saboonchi case exemplifies the need
for courts to reconsider the search warrant exceptions, pursuant to Riley, to see if the
original justifications of the exception are still present.223 After this re-examination,
courts are required to weigh those governmental interests versus the individuals
212 Id. Judge Grimm even stated that [t]here is no question in my mind that the forensic
search of Saboonchis Devices was more invasive than the conventional searches found to be
violations in Riley, but he still upheld the warrantless search. Id.
213 United States v. Kim, No. 13-0100, 2015 WL 2148070 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015) (noting
that the court eventually suppressed the evidence from the search because the court believed
the search was not conducted at the border). The analysis is useful for this Note and advocates
the same position. Id. at *22.
214 Id. at *19.
215 Id. (citation omitted).
216 Id.
217 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 844 (2006).
218 See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, No. 14-cr-00412-TEH, 2015 WL 4776096, at *3




222 United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013).
223 United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 81718 (D. Md. 2014).
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privacy interests. That is exactly what was done in the previous cases, and, even though
the cases resulted in different outcomes, theyare consistent. Saboonchi and Kim dem-
onstrated that the original justification for the border search exception is still present
in the face of technology. Johnson demonstrated that, even though one justification
for the parole search exception was eliminated, that did not outweigh the other justifi-
cations that were still present. In contrast, the original justifications for the search war-
rant exception in public schools are not present in the face of technology.
VI. POLICIES SCHOOL DISTRICTS SHOULD IMPLEMENT
School administrators currently face the problem of determining when they are
justified to conduct a warrantless search of a student. This problem has often led to
civil cases by a student claiming a violation of her constitutional rights.224 School dis-
tricts do not want to be subject to these suits, but administrators want to effectively
deal with problems when they arise. It is difficult to determine which policies to im-
plement, especially with the emergence of new technologies. Riley demonstrates that
technological advances are unique and often require different analysis under the law.225
How then should school districts protect themselves from suits while maintaining
order in their schools?
First, school districts should ban the use of cell phones in schools and request
students to leave their phones in lockers, book bags, or somewhere out of sight. This
will hopefully reduce the use of cell phones in schools, but inevitably some students
will disregard the rules and distract other students. All school officials should have
the power to confiscate a phone upon seeing the phone.
Second, school districts should increase the punishment for the use of a phone in
school. If students face greater discipline, the students will shy away from using the
phone during school hours. Again, this will not eliminate the problem, but hopefully
curtail it.
Next, school districts should allow students to use phones during class breaks
and lunchtime. It is much easier to hold off on the use of a phone for an hour than for
the whole day. If students were allowed to access their phones intermittently, then
students might be able to wait to use their phone until the break. Moreover, when a
student is using his or her phone in-between classes or at lunchtime, there is no real
disruption to the learning process or possibility of a student cheating on an exam.
School districts, therefore, should confiscate phones only when a student is caught
with the phone during class time.
After confiscation, however, the school districts should ban officials from search-
ing the phone. Confiscation prevents further distraction to students and teachers, and
often teachers have no reason to search or to believe illegal activity is evidenced on
the phone. Similar to the search incident to arrest exception, if the phone is confiscated,
224 See, e.g., Klump v. Nazareth Area Sch. Dist., 425 F. Supp. 2d 622 (E.D. Pa. 2006).
225 See supra Part III.
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any evidence on the phone will be present if and when a search warrant is obtained.
If there are truly exceptional circumstances that require swift action to protect students
or teachers, school officials can rely on the exigent circumstances exception.226
This policy will allow schools to maintain order and not violate a students
constitutional protections. One of the original T.L.O. justifications is adhered to, and
the other justificationprotecting the safety of studentsis maintained under the
exigent circumstances exception. School districts will alsobe immune fromunwanted
lawsuits if the schools follow the policy. Without this policy in place, school officials
will continue to search cell phones with little to no suspicion of wrong-doing other
than that the individual violated a policy by using the phone or having it out. The
absence of a well-thought-out policy could lead to abuse by school officials and/or
police. This Note advocates a policy that hopefully will reduce the improper use of
cell phones in schools, but also set a bright-line rule for school officials.
CONCLUSION
Almost all of the people in the United States have a cell phone. Parents acquire
cell phones for their children at younger and younger ages each year.227 One of the
main reasons for children to possess a cell phone is for the child to communicate with
his or her parents when he or she is away from home.228 Children are most often away
from home when they are in school, and parents often desire for their children to take
their phones with them in case of emergencies.229 A phone is not a necessity in
schools, but it allows children to communicate with their parents after school if, for
example, a student just finished an extracurricular activity and needs for a parent to
come pick him or her up. This, however, is not the reason why most students bring
their cell phones to school. Teenagers often communicate with each other during the
school day or play games when they get bored.230
This causes a great distraction in school systems today, and school districts have
been working on various policies to try to restrict the use of phones in schools.231
Many students disregard the rules, and teachers have to confiscate the phones. School
officials may believe that a student has evidence on the phone of violations of school
policies or of illegal criminal conduct. Teachers currently search phones based on
T.L.O.s relaxation of the warrant requirement on school grounds.232
226 If an exigent circumstance presents itself in the classroom, the teacher should first
contact the school principal and police before trying to determine the extent of the exigency
by searching the phone.
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Cell phones, however, are different from other tangible items that were at stake
in T.L.O. The Court may not have envisioned this problem when deciding T.L.O. and
may not have wished the exception to extend to technological advances. The Supreme
Court recently recognized that some technology is separate from other personal items
that a person might carry in Riley.233 Riley held that the search incident to arrest ex-
ception does not apply to cell phones and that police must obtain a warrant to search
an arrestees cell phone.234 The Court made this determination because the original
justifications for the search incident to arrest exception were not present in the con-
text of cell phones.235 The Court reviewed the original justifications because the Court
stated that is what is required when the Court faces a new challenge that was not
present when the original cases were determined.236 The ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and courts do not have to blindly follow prec-
edent that was contrived in a time when cell phones were not present. The Court then
conducted a balancing test in which the expectation of privacy of an arrestees cell
phone outweighed the governmental concern for a warrantless search.237
Just as in Riley, the courts should review the original justifications of a warrantless
search in a school and see if they apply to cell phones. T.L.O. justified warrantless
searches of a students belongings in the school context in order for schools to main-
tain order and to protect students.238 Similar to Riley, T.L.O.s justifications disappear
with respect to cell phones.239 Cell phones cannot hurt other students, and schools can
maintain order by confiscating the cell phone.240 A cell phone in the teachers hands
can no longer distract students, and the teachers often do not have a reason to search
the phone.241 Warrantless searches of a cell phone are unreasonable almost in every
context because of the reasonable expectation of privacy a student has in the data on
her phone.242 This expectation of privacy outweighs the governmental concerns that
are absent in the context of cell phones in schools.243
School districts should implement policies banning cell phones from classrooms
and should confiscate phones that are in violation of this policy.244 Upon confiscation,
however, school districts should prevent officials from searching a students cell
phone without a warrant. This is reasonable.
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